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Introduction 
Women’s under-representation in decision-making has been a strong focus of EU policy 
since the mid-1990s when the topic was inscribed in the Beijing Platform for Action and 
incorporated in key strategic documents such as the Strategy for Equality between Women 
and Men 2010-2015 (European Commission, 2010b) and the Strategic Engagement for 
Gender Equality 2016-2019 (European Commission, 2015). Inequalities are most marked 
among corporate board representation (De Bonfils et al., 2013; Humbert et al., 2015). To 
remedy this, and following the introduction of board quotas in Norway in 2003, EU-level 
legislation was suggested by Commissioner Reding in 2011 and in 2017 by Commissioner 
Jourová. However, board quotas continue to be a contested and highly divisive topic.  
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The legitimacy of using quotas in politics (Krook, 2006; Dahlerup, 2008; Meier, 2008) or in 
publicly listed companies (Tienari et al., 2009; Teigen, 2012; Seierstad, 2013; Terjesen and 
Sealy, 2016), rather than waiting for parity, has often been debated. Here, we explore the 
relationship between board quotas, how gender equal a country is and women’s board 
representation in the EEA in the period 2006 to 2018. Gender equality is understood as the 
gap between women and men in various societal aspects such as work, education or health. 
Furthermore, we differentiate between different types of sanctions and measures to 
understand potential relationships with women's board representation. The rationale for this 
work is to bridge the gap between quotas as a remedy to women’s under-representation on 
boards and structural inequalities or masculine domination (Lombardo and Meier, 2006; 
Gabaldon et al., 2016). The relationship between levels of gender equality and quotas on 
women’s board representation has seldom been examined (for an exception see Iannotta et 
al., 2016), and sanctions have been neglected. Board quotas are often justified by the 
‘business case’ – for instance in relation to financial performance, business strategy, 
reputation or social/ethical aspects (Kirsch, 2018). This is in line with a wider move away 
from rights-based approaches (Elomäki, 2015) which aim at a transformation of legal, social 
and economic structures that enable individuals to exercise and enjoy their rights equally 
outside of power relations, notably those operating along the axis of gender (Carella and 
Ackerly, 2017). We argue that a greater focus on a rights-based approach would be beneficial 
for the discourses on gender on boards.  
 
Examining board equality across various contexts remains rare (for an exception see 
Bullough et al., 2012). We therefore seek to respond to calls to develop multi-level theories 
(Hitt et al., 2007) and analyze the relationship between business and society (Jones, 1983), 
following on from the approach of Terjesen et al. (2015) who examined the influence of 
different institutional domains on gender board quota legislation and women’s board 
representation. This responds to calls for conducting comparative research across countries 
(Terjesen and Singh, 2008; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011; Terjesen et al., 2015) and 
particularly the  influence of cultural norms in society (Iannotta et al., 2016). The article thus 
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contributes to the literature by examining the relation between women’s under-representation 
on boards and societal or institutional factors such as the presence of board quotas, sanctions 
and gender equality. Methodologically, this is achieved by conducting a comparative analysis 
across EEA countries but also over time in response to calls for longitudinal research that 
examines the effects of regulatory mechanisms (Klettner et al., 2016).  
 
The paper first summarizes key developments in relation to gender equality in decision-
making and board quotas in the EU. It then formulates hypotheses about how gender equality 
and legislated quotas affect women’s representation on boards. The results show that – as 
can be expected – board quotas work, but that the context in which they are introduced 
matters. Furthermore, results show that sanctions attached to board quotas also matter. 
Women’s board representation is highest where there are both board quotas with hard 
sanctions and higher gender equality in society.   
 
The divisive topic of board quotas  
Women’s low representation on boards is the result of multiple barriers and is recognized as 
an important challenge (European Commission, 2012a) and a central feature of EU policy 
(European Commission, 2010a; European Commission, 2015). The issue of women’s 
underrepresentation on corporate boards is presented as one related to the ‘business case’ 
rather than about fairness and equality, exemplified in a speech given by former 
Commissioner Viviane Reding in 2011 (Reding, 2011).  
 
On 1st March 2011, Commissioner Reding launched the ‘Women on Board Pledge for 
Europe’ (European Commission, 2011), calling publicly listed companies in the EU to sign 
a voluntary commitment to reach a level of representation of women of 30% by 2015, 
increasing to 40% by 2020. The Pledge received initial widespread support from other EU 
institutions, including the European Parliament  (European Parliament, 2011; European 
Parliament, 2012), but with mixed support at national level (European Commission, 2012a).  
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In light of the lack of progress, the European Commission drafted a proposal for quota 
legislation (European Commission, 2012b). The proposal only concerned publicly listed 
companies, and not small and medium enterprises. It was also devised as a temporary 
measure, with an expiration date set in 2028. In 2013, the European Parliament backed the 
proposal, however in  2014, ministers did not agree on how gender-balanced boards would 
be best achieved (Council of the European Union, 2014a). A new draft Directive was 
produced by the European Commission, watering down the initial version by no longer 
providing for mandatory quotas, but instead on fairer selection mechanisms. In 2014, 
ministers discussed the draft Directive but were unable to reach an agreement (Council of the 
European Union, 2014b) and the issue was not discussed in further Council meetings. It 
therefore seems that despite the efforts put by various institutional actors in devising an EU 
Directive on board quotas, this attempt has been unsuccessful. By end of 2017, the European 
Commissioner in charge of justice and gender equality announced a renewed push for gender 
quotas (Boffey, 2017), but with little progress at the time of writing. However, the impact of 
these efforts at national level cannot be underestimated since several European countries have 
adopted board quotas and debates about whether to implement them in other countries 
continue to take place. This article contributes empirically to these debates by analyzing the 
extent to which progress in women’s board representation stems from greater gender equality 
and/or the implementation of board quotas.  
 
Gender Equality, Board Quotas and Women’s Representation in Decision-making 
The underrepresentation of women in decision-making has been related to differences in 
aspirations (Lips, 2001) that explain that women ‘lack ambition’ or ‘choose’ not to put 
themselves forward . This view relies on an agentic vision of women in relation to their path 
towards decision-making that ignores how national culture can contribute to women’s 
‘choices’ (Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). The gender paradigm operates at individual level, 
with its collective aggregation serving to shape how gender equal a society is. It is therefore 
imperative to examine, in a cross-national setting, what the relationship is between gender 
equality in society and representation level. As Werhane and Painter-Morland (2011: 2) state, 
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there is a need to “fundamentally re-evaluate our stereotypical understandings of leadership: 
the places where it occurs, the structures it requires and the individuals who participate in it”. 
Walby (2009) theorises gender equality in relation to complex inequalities. This describes 
three approaches that gender equality can take, and has informed both policy and academic 
discussions. First, the sameness approach, which largely relies on using (hegemonic) men as 
the benchmark for women’s achievements. Second, the difference approach, where the 
different contributions that women and men can make are recognised and valued equally. 
Third, the transformative approach in which the focus is on changing the systems through 
restructuring groups and standards. The introduction of legislated quotas can respond to all 
three approaches. It can aim at redressing women’s under-representation on boards in 
numerical terms towards parity. However, women’s numerical representation does not mean 
they achieve substantive representation (Celis et al., 2008), with the latter more aligned with 
transformative approaches. We argue that both the sameness and difference approaches are 
largely aligned with arguments rooted in rights-based approaches (Chant and Sweetman, 
2012), where ensuring women’s representation is seen as the right thing to do based on a 
social justice argument. We contrast this with the business case argument, which we see as 
more aligned to the difference approach. This is because the predominant argument therein 
is that women and men bring different skills and talents that in turn may be beneficial to 
organisations. Informed by rights-based approaches, we argue that women’s under-
representation in decision-making can be explained by the cumulative effect of inequalities 
and discrimination that operate at all levels and particularly societal context.  
 
Gender inequalities across countries persist, and may undermine women’s access to decision-
making positions by failing to counteract the stereotypes that have held women back (Peters 
et al., 2013). Countries that are more gender equal may also provide women with greater 
human capital (Wright et al., 1995) or alternatively lead to greater legitimacy and greater 
opportunities to leverage experience (Post and Byron, 2015). However, any progress might 
be hindered by a lack of affordable childcare or a supportive taxation regime (Klettner et al., 
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2016). We therefore hypothesize that the gender equality context of a given country is 
positively related to the extent to which women are represented in top leadership positions:  
Hypothesis 1: Women’s representation on corporate boards of directors is higher in 
countries that are more gender equal. 
 
The ‘business case’ approach argues that the low proportion of women on boards is not only 
an injustice in itself, but can also have potentially harmful effects on organizations. Studies 
have argued that greater gender balance on boards leads to better business performance and 
overall outcomes (Bilimoria, 2006; Terjesen et al., 2009; European Commission, 2012a). 
However, that might be contingent on whether a voluntary or regulatory approach was 
adopted (Labelle et al., 2015). To tackle the underrepresentation of women in decision-
making positions, the policy context has been infused by passionate discourses on whether 
or not to use board quotas, as well as their (un)intended consequences (Terjesen et al., 2015). 
While it is clear that quota legislation generates change greater than any other interventions 
(Terjesen et al., 2015), evidence from Norway suggests that quotas have not been successful 
at raising women’s board representation on boards much beyond the 40% mark (Seierstad 
and Opsahl, 2011; Wang and Kelan, 2013). We therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Countries in which board quotas have been introduced have a higher 
representation of women on boards. 
 
In politics, the introduction of quotas largely responds to the need for ‘critical acts’ to be 
performed (Dahlerup, 1988) that may speed up the process of ‘incremental track’ and create 
a ‘fast track’ (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005). Krook (2006) also shows that support for 
political quotas is related to whether they are consistent with existing or emerging societal 
notions of equality and representation but also whether they are supported by international 
norms and spread through transnational sharing. Like political quotas, board quotas are the 
product of the context in which they are instituted, with Terjesen et al. (2015) arguing that 
three core factors are at play: family welfare provision to support women’s participation in 
the labor market; left leaning governments; and a legacy of gender equality initiatives in the 
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country. The extent to which the introduction of legislated board quotas can then modulate 
the strength of the hypothesized relationships between levels of gender equality and women’s 
board representation becomes pertinent. To examine these dynamics, the relationship 
between having both legislated board quotas and greater gender equality with women’s board 
representation is considered:  
Hypothesis 3: The presence of legislated board quotas moderates the positive relationship 
between levels of gender equality and women’s board representation (H1). 
 
 
Methodology 
The analysis relies on a panel dataset (2006-2018), for all EEA countries except Lichtenstein 
(28 EU Member States plus Iceland and Norway). This period corresponds to a period of 
great debates in both the academic and policy arenas, following the introduction of a 40% 
quota for women directors in Norway in 2003 (Terjesen et al., 2015).  
 
Variables 
The dependent variable is the proportion of women on the boards of public quoted 
companies. These data have been collected since 2003 (European Institute for Gender 
Equality, 2018) and cover the gender balance in key positions at national level in the largest 
publicly listed companies (defined as the members, up to a maximum of 50, of the primary 
blue-chip index e.g. FTSE 100 or  DAX30). The highest decision-making body can include 
either a supervisory board or a board of directors depending on the company system. Data 
are compiled from a variety of sources, including company websites, stock-exchange 
websites and the companies’ annual reports (Table 1).  
 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------- 
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We use the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum, 
2018) to measure how gender equal a country is (Table 2). It consists of a single score that 
ranges from 0 to 1 (rescaled between 0 and 100 for easier interpretation). It has been used in 
other gender-related corporate governance research (e.g. Post and Byron, 2015). The 
concurrent validity (Kerlinger and Howard, 1964) of the Global Gender Gap Index can be 
ascertained by noticing that there is a strong correlation with other composite measures of 
gender equality such as the Gender Equality Index (r = 0.82) (Humbert et al., 2015).  
 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------- 
 
A variable that captures the board quotas is included, with information collected and 
triangulated from a variety of sources. By 2018, eight EEA countries had legislated quotas 
for publicly listed companies (Table 3).  
 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------- 
 
Modelling 
Panel data regressions with fixed effects were used to assess the relationship between levels 
of gender equality and women’s representation on boards, and explore whether this is 
moderated by the presence of legislated board quotas: 
 
WOB𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖12𝑖𝑖=2 +  𝛾𝛾1GE𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +∝1  LQ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
 
where d is a dummy variable, WOB stands for ‘women’s representation on boards’, GE for 
‘levels of gender equality’, and LQ for the presence of a ‘legislated board quota’ where one 
has been introduced (0 where there is no quota, alternatively 1), in country i and time t 
(ranging from 1 to 12). We focus on the date at which the board quotas were introduced, 
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rather than the date full implementation is expected, as effects are likely to start when they 
are first announced (Singh et al., 2015). Scores for the Gender Gap Index are mean-centred 
to minimize potential issues with multicollinearity (Aiken and West, 1991). The panel data 
allows us, through the inclusion of fixed effects, to control for the potential idiosyncratic 
effects of time. This is done through the inclusion of a dummy variable in the model for each 
year (to avoid multi-collinearity, dummies are excluded for the year 2006). GDP per capita 
is included as a control variable to account for the economic development level of each 
country.  
 
Post-hoc analysis 
To provide a more nuanced account of the potential effects of different types of measures on 
women’s board representation, further analyses were conducted which incorporate three 
types: a legislated board quota with hard sanctions such as either or both fines and the 
suspension/dismissal of directors (e.g. Norway); a legislated board quota with soft sanctions 
such as a ‘complain or explain’ mechanism (e.g. Germany) or the ineligibility to receive 
public funds (e.g. Spain); another type of measure such as a Code of Corporate Governance. 
Where a Code of Governance was followed by quota legislation, only the latter is considered. 
The analysis also explored potential interactions, following the logic of the argument in the 
main analysis.  
 
Correlation matrix 
All three groups of variables are strongly correlated to each other over time (Table 4). As all 
correlations are moderate (less than 0.8), there is no evidence of a problem with multi-
collinearity. Potential multi-collinearity was further assessed through Variance Influence 
Factors (VIFs), with all values well below 10 (Neter et al., 1989). 
 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------- 
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Results 
Model 1 (Table 5) suggests that higher gender equality scores are positively associated with 
women’s representation on boards (β = 1.40, p < 0.01), supporting Hypothesis 1. Model 2 
confirms that women’s board representation is higher in countries where legislated board 
quotas are in place, supporting Hypothesis 2 (β = 11.99, p < 0.01). Model 3 confirms that 
both gender equality and boards quotas are associated with higher representation of women 
on boards (β = 1.22 and β = 7.61 respectively, p < 0.01).  
 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------- 
 
Model 4 introduces an interaction parameter between the presence of legislated board quotas 
and gender equality. This provides a positive coefficient (β = 0.35, p < 0.05) which supports 
Hypothesis 3 and suggests that having legislated board quotas combined with higher levels 
of gender equality is associated with higher levels of women’s board representation.  
 
In 2018, the scores of the Global Gender Gap Index ranged from 67 (Hungary) to 86 out of 
100 (Iceland). With this in mind, Model 4 shows that there is about an additional one 
percentage point increase (1.13) in representation for every point increase in the score of the 
Global Gender Gap Index – all other variables staying constant. As for the interaction 
parameter, it shows that the effects of having legislated board quotas is only marginally 
higher than not having them for countries at the lower end of the Global Gender Gap Index. 
This contrasts with countries higher gender equality, as can be seen by the steeper slope for 
countries with legislated board quotas, illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
-------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------- 
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As part of the post-hoc analysis, measures were expanded to include both board quotas with 
soft/hard sanctions and other measures such as codes of governance (Table 6). Model 5 shows 
that the positive effect of board quotas on women’s board representation is higher when 
associated with hard sanctions such as fines and/or the suspension or dismissal of directors 
(β = 18.94, p < 0.01) than soft sanctions (β = 7.20, p < 0.01). Adding information in Model 
6 about the presence of Codes of Governance shows that they too have a positive effect on 
women’s board representation (β = 8.97, p < 0.01), but less than board quotas with hard 
sanctions (β = 23.03, p < 0.01) or soft sanctions (β = 10.36, p < 0.01). Adding gender equality 
levels in Model 7 reduces the effects of the presence of legislated board quotas with hard 
sanctions (β = 14.14, p < 0.01) or soft sanctions (β = 6.98, p < 0.01) and codes of governance 
(β = 4.27, p < 0.01).  
 
 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------- 
 
Models 8 and 9 show that both board quotas hard sanctions and codes interact with level of 
gender equality, but not board quotas with soft sanctions. Having a code of governance and 
lower gender equality is associated with a representation of women on boards similar to 
countries with no measures in place. However, a code of governance where there are higher 
levels of gender equality is associated with a level of women’s representation on boards just 
below that of countries with board quotas with hard sanctions (Figure 2).  
 
-------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------- 
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Beyond the ‘quota question’: a call for focusing on rights 
The analysis shows where there is more gender equality at societal level coupled with board 
quotas (particularly with hard sanctions), there are more women represented on corporate 
boards. This adds to previous research by showing that board quotas work best in countries 
that are more gender equal. Furthermore, quotas work more or less efficiently depending on 
sanctions. Board quotas with hard sanctions work best, regardless of the level of gender 
equality in a country. Having a code of governance, when associated with higher levels of 
gender equality, is also associated with higher levels of women’s board representation. 
However, board quotas with soft sanctions are associated with results that are only marginally 
better than not having any measure in place.  
 
Overall, this provides evidence that a targeted action such as legislated board quotas can be 
a key driver of progress, particularly when associated with hard sanctions. If hard sanctions 
exist, actors are more likely to comply with and act upon the board quota because there is a 
real risk to the corporation that needs to be mitigated. With soft sanctions, risks might not 
appear as particularly high, leading to non-action. If board quotas are successful in pushing 
for change, a counter-movement might try to undo that (Roggeband, 2018). Board quotas can 
cause resistance and negativity within organizations because they are perceived as displacing 
‘merit’ (Humbert et al., 2018). However, that is much more difficult if hard sanctions are in 
place because there are punitive consequences for non-compliance that could hurt a 
corporation. A strategy to mitigate risk is to comply rather than to fight the quota. That does 
not mean that resistance does not exist, because it is exactly the ability of board quotas with 
hard sanctions to produce change that creates deep-seated resistance and opposition (Ahrens, 
2018).  
 
In addition, our results suggest that board quotas cannot be relied upon as instruments of 
progress independently of a contextual environment that is more gender equal. Board quotas 
largely speak to a business or market logic where gender equality is largely understood 
through the prism of ‘sameness’ or ‘difference’ rather than transformation (Walby, 2009), 
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although this takes different forms in different societal contexts (Tienari et al., 2009). This 
makes it even more pressing to consider the gender equality context in which board quotas 
are proposed or implemented, since greater gender equality potentially mitigates these risks 
by allowing greater space for questioning and criticizing how to tackle women’s under-
representation on boards. This is particularly the case where gender equality is understood as 
a political and transformative project that seeks to transform power relations and address 
inequalities of minoritized groups, including women (Chant and Sweetman, 2012).  In light 
of the growing trend for EU institutions and related actors to follow a market-oriented 
discourse (Elomäki, 2015), which is also dominant in studies on gender on boards (cf. Kirsch, 
2018), these results provide empirical evidence of the importance of not foregoing a rights-
based approach in calling for greater equality in decision-making. Such an approach would 
mean moving away from focusing on efficiency and productivity gains and instead centre on 
women’s rights to participate and contribute to decision-making on boards. Women’s 
representation on boards ought to be more than simply a numbers’ game. Quotas, as Jansson 
(2017: 10) argues, shape women into “tokens of equality rather than as agents for liberation”. 
What is at stake is the substantive equal representation of women and men as leaders that 
privilege equality ideals over the market forces inherent in the business case approach 
(Tienari et al., 2009). As outlined by Elomäki (2015), women’s under-representation in 
leadership positions has become less about a focus on substantive representation and more a 
rational economic exercise in fully using women’s human capital. To transform gender 
relations, our results suggest that this is a false dichotomy in that the combination works best 
at least in relation to numerical representation. It is likely that these relationships are more 
complex than the ones considered here, and that there is in fact a virtuous circle at play 
whereby greater representation contributes to greater equality and/or the adoption of 
legislated measures, ultimately feeding back into greater representation. Although board 
quotas are successful in remedying women’s board under-representation, prior research has 
shown that a focus on appointing more women onto boards often leads to a form of elite 
reproduction where women appointed to boards come from a similar background to men 
appointed to boards (Brown and Kelan, in preparation). Elite women might benefit 
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particularly and are likely to be beneficiaries of this reproduction system, which extends 
beyond ethnicity or class alone.  
 
The article has contributed to the understanding of how gender equal representation on boards 
is related to gender equality and quotas. It extends the literature on gender and decision-
making by examining whether the representation of women on boards in EEA countries 
relates to either or both levels of gender equality and legislated board quotas. The research 
itself is rooted in current academic and policy debates on the introduction of board quotas, 
and demonstrates the importance of ensuring a baseline context of equality. Through this 
analysis, the article has extended the research beyond seeing gender and decision-making on 
an individual level, instead examining the topic within its societal context. In particular, the 
paper makes two contributions through looking at both relationships with women’s board 
representation simultaneously and adding a longitudinal perspective across different 
countries. Panel data analysis represents a trade-off between being able to rely on rich data 
on the one hand (owing to the richness of data availability in the EEA), and the ability to 
generalize on the other when it comes to a broader geographical context. The findings may 
not be applicable to some countries, particularly where their societal context varies greatly 
from the socio-demographic levels afforded to EEA countries. In addition, the European 
context is specific in that the threat of board quotas – at EU or national level – combined with 
isomorphic effects have increased efforts to promote women’s board representation (Terjesen 
et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the relationships examined in this analysis have wider relevance 
and implications beyond the region (Norris and Inglehart, 2001). 
 
In relation to further research, thus far, legislated board quotas – particularly those 
underpinned by hard sanctions – have hardly been implemented. By 2018, only eight EEA 
countries had introduced legislated boards quotas, ranging from as early as 2007 to 2015. 
Furthermore, it is likely that there is a lag-time effect. As full implementation remains recent, 
the complete effect of legislated board quotas is yet to be felt. Repeating such studies in the 
future, as the number of countries with legislated board quotas increases, and as 
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implementation enters into force is needed. Models taking lagged-variables into 
consideration might provide additional insights. The relatively short time-series available for 
this article, combined with the recent introduction of legislated board quotas, does not yet 
permit this type of analysis. The extent to which this then leads to a cultural change on the 
board itself, and lower down in the organization then remains a question of interest, 
particularly as the proportion of women as corporate leaders continues to grow. Such research 
could, for instance, explore whether more women on boards means that there is a greater 
focus on gender equality within organizations. This clearly indicates that further research 
should explore the links between micro, meso and macro perspectives in relation to gender 
and leadership. Where feasible, this should consider the possible actors involved, particularly 
the role they play at the intersection of these different levels and their contribution to pushing 
for change in respective countries (Seierstad et al., 2017). Finally, no distinction is made 
between non-executive and executive functions as data in the original source are only 
available for 2012 and onwards. Following previous research in this specific direction (Post 
and Byron, 2015) further work should consider extending the analysis in this area. 
 
Overall, this article provides evidence that a higher representation of women on company 
boards is the reflection of societies that are more gender equal and/or have introduced 
legislated board quotas. Furthermore, the types of measures and their sanctions matter, with 
board quotas combined with hard sanctions appearing most effective. We conclude that for 
further and faster progress to be made, the introduction of legislated board quotas shows great 
potential, but only in combination with striving for a gender equal society and using hard 
sanctions. Unsurprisingly, board quotas work to increase the representation of women on 
boards, but they work best in contexts that are more gender equal and where quotas come 
with hard sanctions. Our results call for not losing the focus on 'rights' at the expense of the 
more palatable 'business case' for board quotas when striving for equality on corporate 
boards. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Percentage of women on the boards of the largest quoted companies by EU Member 
States, 2006-18 
 2006 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 2018 
Austria 6 5 6 7 9 11 12 13 17 20 18 19 24 
Belgium 6 6 7 8 10 11 13 17 22 26 29 31 31 
Bulgaria 17 15 12 17 11 15 12 17 18 19 15 17 16 
Croatia - 14 12 15 16 19 15 15 19 22 20 22 19 
Cyprus 6 2 3 3 4 5 8 7 9 9 11 10 11 
Czech Republic 8 11 13 13 12 16 16 11 4 10 10 15 16 
Denmark 12 15 17 18 18 16 21 23 24 26 27 30 31 
Estonia 13 10 8 6 7 7 8 7 7 8 9 7 7 
Finland 20 18 20 24 26 26 29 30 29 29 30 33 34 
France 8 9 9 10 12 22 25 30 32 36 41 43 44 
Germany 11 11 13 13 13 15 18 21 24 26 30 32 33 
Greece 8 11 6 5 6 6 8 8 9 10 9 11 10 
Hungary 12 11 16 13 14 5 7 11 12 18 12 15 15 
Iceland 6 10 10 16 16 21 36 48 45 44 45 43 46 
Ireland 5 6 7 8 8 9 9 11 11 15 17 18 18 
Italy 4 3 4 4 5 6 11 15 24 29 32 34 36 
Latvia 21 17 16 17 23 27 28 29 32 30 29 29 30 
Lithuania 16 18 16 15 13 14 18 16 17 14 14 14 14 
Luxembourg 1 3 3 3 4 6 10 11 12 12 13 12 14 
Malta 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 2 3 5 5 8 8 
Netherlands 8 14 14 15 15 18 22 25 25 26 28 30 30 
Norway 35 34 43 42 39 41 44 42 38 39 43 42 41 
Poland 9 12 10 10 12 12 12 12 15 19 19 20 20 
Portugal 7 3 3 4 5 6 7 9 9 14 14 16 17 
Romania 13 18 12 12 21 10 12 8 11 12 10 11 8 
Slovakia 10 24 18 18 22 15 14 24 18 13 13 15 21 
Slovenia 19 14 18 10 10 14 19 22 20 22 25 23 26 
Spain 4 6 8 10 10 11 12 15 17 19 20 22 23 
Sweden 24 24 27 27 26 25 26 26 28 33 37 36 36 
United Kingdom 12 12 12 12 13 16 19 21 24 28 27 27 29 
Source: European Institute for Gender Equality (2018) 
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Table 2: Global Gender Gap Index scores in EEA countries, 2006-2018 
  
2006 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 2018 
Austria 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.72 
Belgium 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 
Bulgaria 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.76 0.76 
Croatia 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.71 
Cyprus 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.68 
Czech Republic 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Denmark 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.78 0.78 
Estonia 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.73 
Finland 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.82 0.82 
France 0.65 0.68 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.78 
Germany 0.75 0.76 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.78 
Greece 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.70 
Hungary 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Iceland 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.86 
Ireland 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.80 
Italy 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.73 0.72 0.69 0.71 
Latvia 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Lithuania 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 
Luxembourg 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.71 
Malta 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.69 
Netherlands 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.74 0.75 
Norway 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.84 
Poland 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73 
Portugal 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.73 
Romania 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.71 
Slovakia 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 
Slovenia 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.79 0.81 0.78 
Spain 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.75 
Sweden 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
United Kingdom 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.77 
Source: World Economic Forum (2006-2018) 
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Table 3: Quotas and Codes of Corporate Governance across the European Union Member States 
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Country Legislated quotas for 
Listed Companies 
Sanctions Code of Corporate Governance or other national measure 
Austria 
 
 2009: Corporate Code of Governance recommends the 
representation of both women and men in supervisory 
boards.   
Belgium 2011 (implemented 
by 2017-19): 33% 
Soft: 
• Void the appointment of any directors who do not 
conform to board quota targets 
• Appointments to any vacant positions are invalid as 
long the quota is not fulfilled 
• Suspension of any advantage, financial or otherwise, 
for board members 
2009: Corporate Governance Code recommends gender 
diversity in board composition.  
Bulgaria    
Croatia    
Cyprus    
Czech Republic    
Denmark   2013: Listed companies are obliged to self-regulate and 
set their own targets, or can be fined.  
Estonia    
Finland   2010: Corporate Governance Code for listed companies 
recommends that boards include both women and men 
France 2011 (implemented 
by 2017): 40% 
Soft: 
• Suspension of benefits of Directors 
• Nullification of the board elections, but the decisions 
adopted by the board remain valid 
2011: AFEP-MEDEF Corporate Code has the same 
recommendation as the quota law and is applicable to all 
board members.  
Germany 2015 (implemented 
by 2016): 30% 
Soft: 
• Leave position vacant  
• “Empty chair sanction” 
2010: Corporate Governance Code amended to 
recommend an appropriate degree of women’s 
representation on supervisory boards 
Greece    
Hungary    
Iceland 2010 (implemented 
by 2013): 40% 
Hard  
• Declaration of corrective measures 
• Financial penalties 
 
Ireland 
 
  
Italy 2011 (implemented 
by 2015): 33% 
Hard  
• Fines 
• Directors lose office 
• Progressive sanctions: official warnings, fines, 
forfeiture of the offices of elected board members 
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Latvia    
Lithuania    
Luxembourg   2009: Corporate Code recommends an appropriate 
representation of women and men among all board 
members.  
Malta    
Netherlands 2011 (initially 
implemented by 
2016, extended to 
2010): 30% 
Soft 
• Statutory target 
• “Comply or explain” 
2009: Corporate Governance Code recommends 
diversity for both executives and non-executives. Also, 
Voluntary Charter for more women in management.  
 
Norway 2006 (implemented 
by 2008): 40% 
Hard 
• Refuse to register board 
• Dissolve company and delist from the stock 
exchange 
• Official warnings 
• Financial penalties until compliance 
 
Poland    
Portugal   2015: Government resolution encourages listed 
companies to attain 30 % of the under-represented sex in 
their administrative bodies by 2018.  
Romania    
Slovakia    
Slovenia    
Spain 2007 (implemented 
by 2015): 40% 
Soft 
• Void consideration for public subsidies and state 
contract 
• No sanctions for failure to comply, but taking into 
account in procedures to award a public contract or 
the “equality label” 
 
Sweden   2004: Corporate Governance Code has a voluntary goal 
of parity for listed companies.  
United Kingdom   2012: Corporate Governance Code (following the Lord 
Davies’ recommendation and subsequently Hampton-
Alexander review).  
 
Source: based on European Commission (2012a); Cesifo (2013); Terjesen et al. (2015); European Commission (2016); Kirsch (2017); Kirsch (2018). 
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Table 4: Correlation matrix 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 WoB 2006 1                         
2 WoB 2007 0.87 1             
3 WoB 2008 0.90 0.93 1            
4 WoB 2009 0.85 0.91 0.96 1           
5 WoB 2010 0.82 0.91 0.91 0.95 1          
6 WoB 2011 0.77 0.78 0.83 0.90 0.88 1         
7 WoB 2012 0.66 0.67 0.75 0.81 0.80 0.94 1        
8 WoB 2013 0.51 0.56 0.63 0.72 0.70 0.84 0.94 1       
9 WoB 2014 0.45 0.46 0.53 0.63 0.63 0.78 0.89 0.95 1      
10 WoB 2015 0.41 0.37 0.49 0.59 0.58 0.75 0.84 0.90 0.97 1     
11 WoB 2016 0.39 0.34 0.48 0.55 0.53 0.73 0.83 0.88 0.94 0.98 1    
12 WoB 2017 0.35 0.33 0.47 0.55 0.53 0.73 0.81 0.86 0.92 0.97 0.99 1   
13 WoB 2018 0.30 0.29 0.44 0.52 0.50 0.70 0.80 0.87 0.92 0.96 0.98 0.99 1 
14 Quotas 2006 0.63 0.57 0.71 0.68 0.60 0.61 0.56 0.43 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.30 
15 Quotas 2007 0.31 0.30 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.21 
16 Quotas 2008 0.31 0.30 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.21 
17 Quotas 2009 0.31 0.30 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.21 
18 Quotas 2010 0.18 0.22 0.34 0.42 0.35 0.41 0.52 0.55 0.48 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.40 
19 Quotas 2011 -0.08 -0.02 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.41 0.50 0.55 0.58 0.63 0.64 0.62 
20 Quotas 2012 -0.08 -0.02 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.41 0.50 0.55 0.58 0.63 0.64 0.62 
21 Quotas 2013 -0.08 -0.02 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.41 0.50 0.55 0.58 0.63 0.64 0.62 
22 Quotas 2014 -0.08 -0.02 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.41 0.50 0.55 0.58 0.63 0.64 0.62 
23 Quotas 2015 -0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.29 0.41 0.49 0.57 0.59 0.65 0.67 0.66 
24 Quotas 2016 -0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.29 0.41 0.49 0.57 0.59 0.65 0.67 0.66 
25 Quotas 2017 -0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.29 0.41 0.49 0.57 0.59 0.65 0.67 0.66 
26 Quotas 2018 -0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.29 0.41 0.49 0.57 0.59 0.65 0.67 0.66 
27 GGI 2006 0.55 0.54 0.64 0.74 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.58 
28 GGI 2007 0.56 0.54 0.63 0.74 0.69 0.73 0.74 0.70 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.61 
29 GGI 2008 0.58 0.52 0.64 0.75 0.70 0.79 0.83 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.73 
30 GGI 2009 0.53 0.49 0.61 0.72 0.67 0.76 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.74 
31 GGI 2010 0.43 0.40 0.53 0.64 0.59 0.68 0.77 0.76 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.68 
32 GGI 2011 0.41 0.39 0.51 0.63 0.58 0.68 0.76 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.69 
33 GGI 2012 0.42 0.39 0.51 0.63 0.59 0.68 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.68 
34 GGI 2013 0.42 0.39 0.51 0.62 0.59 0.69 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.71 0.70 
35 GGI 2014 0.44 0.38 0.50 0.62 0.57 0.71 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.79 0.77 
36 GGI 2015 0.44 0.34 0.48 0.56 0.50 0.66 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.75 0.74 
37 GGI 2016 0.47 0.36 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.67 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.73 0.72 
38 GGI 2017 0.50 0.41 0.51 0.58 0.51 0.69 0.78 0.80 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.73 0.72 
39 GGI 2018 0.52 0.43 0.54 0.61 0.55 0.72 0.80 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.75 0.74 
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Table 4: Correlation matrix (continued) 
 
   14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1 WoB 2006              
2 WoB 2007              
3 WoB 2008              
4 WoB 2009              
5 WoB 2010              
6 WoB 2011              
7 WoB 2012              
8 WoB 2013              
9 WoB 2014              
10 WoB 2015              
11 WoB 2016              
12 WoB 2017              
13 WoB 2018              
14 Quotas 2006 1                         
15 Quotas 2007 0.69 1             
16 Quotas 2008 0.69 1.00 1            
17 Quotas 2009 0.69 1.00 1.00 1           
18 Quotas 2010 0.56 0.80 0.80 0.80 1          
19 Quotas 2011 0.34 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.60 1         
20 Quotas 2012 0.34 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.60 1.00 1        
21 Quotas 2013 0.34 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.60 1.00 1.00 1       
22 Quotas 2014 0.34 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1      
23 Quotas 2015 0.31 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.55 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 1     
24 Quotas 2016 0.31 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.55 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 1.00 1    
25 Quotas 2017 0.31 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.55 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 1.00 1.00 1   
26 Quotas 2018 0.31 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.55 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 
27 GGI 2006 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.46 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
28 GGI 2007 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.46 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
29 GGI 2008 0.43 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
30 GGI 2009 0.39 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
31 GGI 2010 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.58 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
32 GGI 2011 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.56 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
33 GGI 2012 0.37 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.47 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
34 GGI 2013 0.37 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.49 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
35 GGI 2014 0.34 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.43 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 
36 GGI 2015 0.35 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.47 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 
37 GGI 2016 0.35 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.48 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
38 GGI 2017 0.31 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.48 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
39 GGI 2018 0.35 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.47 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
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Table 4: Correlation matrix (continued) 
   27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
1 WoB 2006              
2 WoB 2007              
3 WoB 2008              
4 WoB 2009              
5 WoB 2010              
6 WoB 2011              
7 WoB 2012              
8 WoB 2013              
9 WoB 2014              
10 WoB 2015              
11 WoB 2016              
12 WoB 2017              
13 WoB 2018              
14 Quotas 2006              
15 Quotas 2007              
16 Quotas 2008              
17 Quotas 2009              
18 Quotas 2010              
19 Quotas 2011              
20 Quotas 2012              
21 Quotas 2013              
22 Quotas 2014              
23 Quotas 2015              
24 Quotas 2016              
25 Quotas 2017              
26 Quotas 2018              
27 GGI 2006 1                         
28 GGI 2007 0.99 1             
29 GGI 2008 0.93 0.95 1            
30 GGI 2009 0.93 0.94 0.99 1           
31 GGI 2010 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.96 1          
32 GGI 2011 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.96 1.00 1         
33 GGI 2012 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.98 0.98 1        
34 GGI 2013 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 1.00 1       
35 GGI 2014 0.85 0.88 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 1      
36 GGI 2015 0.83 0.85 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.95 1     
37 GGI 2016 0.81 0.83 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.99 1    
38 GGI 2017 0.80 0.82 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.92 0.95 0.96 1   
39 GGI 2018 0.83 0.86 0.91 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.99 1 
  
 
Table 5: Panel regression results (dependent variable: Women’s representation on boards) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 β SE Sig. β SE Sig. β SE Sig. β SE Sig. 
Constant 16.92 1.46 ** 9.65 1.72 ** 16.72 1.32 ** 16.52 1.31 ** 
Gender 
equality 1.40 0.07 **    1.22 0.07 ** 1.13 0.08 ** 
Legislated 
quotas    11.99 1.13 ** 7.61 0.87 ** 6.63 0.96 ** 
Legislated 
quotas x 
Gender 
equality 
         0.35 0.15 * 
             
Control for 
GDP per capita Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Controls for 
years 2007-18 Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
             
R2 0.607   0.396   0.679   0.684   
F 41.126   ** 17.461   ** 52.140   ** 49.649   ** 
* p ≤ .05 
** p ≤ .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1 Interaction effect of the presence of quotas and gender equality on women’s board 
representation 
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Table 6: Panel regression results – post-hoc analysis (dependent variable: Women’s representation on boards) 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 β SE Sig. β SE Sig. β SE Sig. β SE Sig. β SE Sig. 
Constant 10.24 1.63 ** 13.50 1.58 ** 17.63 1.28 ** 16.37 1.34 ** 16.40 1.34 ** 
Gender equality       1.05 0.07 ** 0.82 0.10 ** 0.84 0.10 ** 
Quota with hard sanction 18.94 1.55 ** 23.03 1.54 ** 14.14 1.36 ** 12.82 1.58 ** 12.78 1.58 ** 
Quota with soft sanction 7.20 1.32 ** 10.36 1.30 ** 6.98 1.05 ** 7.02 1.23 ** 7.56 1.06 ** 
Code of governance    8.97 1.20 ** 4.27 1.00 ** 3.32 1.16 ** 3.26 1.15 ** 
Legislated quotas with hard sanction x Gender 
equality          0.43 0.18 * 0.41 0.18 * 
Legislated quotas with soft sanction x Gender 
equality          0.37 0.44     
Code of governance x Gender equality          0.54 0.20 ** 0.53 0.20 ** 
                
Control for GDP per capita Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Controls for years 2007-18 Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
                
R2 .458   .533   .711   .720   .719   
F 20.792 **  26.186 **  52.694 **  45.962 **  48.513 **  
* p ≤ .05 
** p ≤ .01 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2 Interaction effects of the types of measures and gender equality on women’s board 
representation 
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